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ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT'S CUSTODY DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH LAW AND
UNREASONABLE.
This Court will vacate or reverse a custody decision if the lower court acted inconsistent

"with relevant legal standards," Boe v. Boe, 163 Idaho 922, 934, 422 P.3d 1128, 1140 (2018), or
if "the evidence is insufficient to support a trial court's conclusion .... " Silva v. Silva, 142 Idaho
900, 904, 136 P.3d 371, 375 (Ct. App. 2006). Both problems pervade the Court's decision here.

A.

Faulting a Woman for Her Efforts to Develop Skills and Provide for Herself
and Her Children During the Divorce Does Not Serve Children's Best
Interests.

In custody decisions "the welfare and best interest of the children are of paramount
importance." Silva, 142 Idaho at 904, 136 P.3d at 375. Though this Court does not "substitute
[its] own view of the evidence for that of the trial court," id., it exercises an important function to
ensure lower courts have clear guidance on the legal standard governing custody decisions. This
case presents an important opportunity to clarify the standard governing child custody. First, a bit
of background.

The Record. Throughout her marriage, Sydney's highest education was "a high school
diploma." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ,r 36, R. 475. 1 When the parties married in
2008, Sydney quit her job "to be a stay at home mom" with their newborn child. Id.

,r,r 1-2, R.

,r,r 3--4,

7, R. 472.

472. Mark worked "long hours" and Sydney took "care of the kids." Id. Id.

This arrangement continued until 2014. Id. In 2014, "Mark and Sydney started their own
business" under the name "Roof Rescue." Id.

,r 7, R.

472. From April 2014 through December

2016 "Mark continued to work long hours at Roof Rescue" and Sydney worked "part-time, as a

1

The record consists of three separately paginated documents. One containing exhibits, which
this brief will cite as "ER"; another containing court filings, cited as "R"; and the last comprising
the transcript of court proceedings, cited as "Tr."
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bookkeeper” for the business. Id. ¶¶ 8–9, R. 473. “After Roof Rescue, Sydney worked at a coffee
shop for minimum wage and then worked at Dillard’s.” Id. ¶ 9, R. 473. During or after 2014, the
Parties began using daycare in Mark’s words “because I wanted Sydney to do something other
than sit around the house.” Tr. 198:16–17; Tr. 199:1–2 (“They were in daycare before she was
working. I wanted her to do something, you know.”).
In October 2017, the parties separated. Tr. 213:4–6. And Mark filed for divorce that
December. Tr. 212:7–8. After separation and throughout the divorce proceedings the parties
cared for the children “on a 50/50 basis.” See Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law ¶ 17, R.
473; Tr. 214:22–25.
Mark received the parties’ Roof Rescue business in the divorce. See Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law ¶ 45, R. 476. Facing a need to provide for herself, Sydney offered
undisputed testimony that she “enrolled in a dental assisting program.” See id. ¶ 36, R. 475. The
course was “an accelerated learning program for dental assistant” that lasted “nine weeks.” Tr.
319:10–13. Sydney testified she would complete the nine-week course “[r]ight before
Thanksgiving” and would then start 160 to 180 hours of clinical work. Tr. 319:24–320:5. She
stated she’d finish everything in “[a] couple months.” Tr. 320:18. Sydney pursued the dental
assistant program to facilitate full-time employment that would work well with her children’s
schedule. Tr. 354:7–10. She testified (without contradiction) “dental offices are generally closed
at five or six. Monday through Friday. No holidays, no weekends.” Id.
Two months before the November 2018 trial, Sydney took a short-term job paying $16 an
hour—more than she’d made before both at Dillard’s or the coffee shop. Tr. 284:2–3; Tr.
286:14–16; Tr. 323:17–324:16; see Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law ¶¶ 9, 36, R. 473,
475. Her temporary employment was only four days a week—Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and
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Friday. Tr. 275:24–276:12. The record is undisputed that this employment was temporary
(ending shortly after trial when Sydney completed her nine-week course), and it’s also
undisputed that Sydney would then start her clinical hours in Idaho Falls—the only place she
ever considered working after her program. Tr. 278:2–18; Tr. 285:2–5; Tr. 319:5–321:3; Tr.
393:8–394:7. The Court understood Sydney’s job was temporary. Order on Motion to
Reconsider, R. 539.
Trial concluded on November 2, 2018, but the Court waited until January 22, 2019 to
issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 471–72. In the interim, custody continued 50/50
as it had since separation. See Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law ¶ 17, R. 473; Tr. 214:22–
25.
On January 22, 2019 the Court turned Sydney and the children’s world upside down—
concluding that it served the children’s best interests to allow Sydney custody only “every other
weekend from Friday when she gets home from work until Sunday at 8:00p.m.” and alternating
weeks in the summers. Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, R. 479.
What was the sole basis for the Court’s decision to drastically reduce Sydney’s contact
with the children? Her temporary job that the Court knew would end before it ever entered its
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Analyzing the factors in Idaho Code § 32-717, the Court
held that all but two were in equipoise. Id. at 476–79.
In finding the character and circumstances weighed in Mark’s favor, the only fact
weighed against Sydney was that “she is trying to finish up dental assisting school and she works
in Victor. Her schedule is that she is gone from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. She commutes roughly 3
hours a day for work. She is hoping to find work in Idaho Falls but that has not happened yet.”
Id. at 478. Similarly, the Court weighed the “continuity and stability” factor in Mark’s favor
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because “Sydney is not quite sure what her future holds as far as finding a dental assisting job in
Idaho Falls. She travels a lot for work now and is gone and unavailable for 11 hours a day and if
there was a need to leave work to attend to the children, she would have at least a 1.5 hour drive
to get there.” Id. The Court continued “Further, in the winter months, the commute for Sydney
could vary in time and take much longer for her to commute to and from work. This also
provides an obstacle for the Court when considering continuity and stability.” Id. These are the
only findings the Court relied on to reduce drastically Sydney’s time with her children.
Why should this Court intervene? The lower court took a temporary job—not
representative of Sydney’s past or future—and the uncertainty of starting a new profession—and
turned the children’s relationship with their mother upside down. R. 488–89. If this court
sustains the decision, it’s telling vulnerable women who have limited education and employment
options that they can lose the kids just because they enroll in an accelerated educational program
and take the best job available. See id. The Court will be telling women that a husband’s decision
to leave with the family business, standing alone is enough for a court to cut parenting time to a
fraction of what it’s been throughout the children’s lives. See id. Such a decision cannot stand
when, as here, there is no record evidence that Mom’s job or education have had any negative
effect on the children. Silva, 142 Idaho at 906, 136 P.3d at 377 (allowing consideration of
employment schedules “to the extent that these circumstances are shown to affect the well-being
of the children.” (emphasis added).
Discouraging women with few skills from getting employed and pursuing educational
training is bad for children—the primary focus of Idaho’s custody statute. See Idaho Code § 32717; Silva, 142 Idaho at 904, 136 P.3d at 375. This Court should vacate the Magistrate Court’s
custody award should and remand so the Magistrate Court can conduct a custody analysis
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focused on the circumstances in place when its order will take effect-not a fleeting transitionary
period caused by Dad's decision to leave the marriage and keep the business.

B.

Ignoring the Legal Standard, the Court Erred when It Considered Sydney's
Temporary Job Without a Record-Supported Nexus Showing Her Job's
Impact on the Children's Well-Being.

Silva is clear that "a parent's work schedule and need for third party child care" may be
"irrelevant to the custody decision in many cases." Silva, 142 Idaho at 904, 136 P.3d at 375.
Considering irrelevant factors conflicts with statute. Roeh v. Roeh, 113 Idaho 557, 558, 746 P.2d
1016, 1017 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding "the court must avoid considering irrelevant factors").
Relevance requires more than a judicially stated conclusion; it requires record evidence. Id. at
558, 746 P.2d at 1018 ("Although the [court's] wording declares a connection between past and
present behavior, no factual connection is provided."). That's why Silva requires a party provide
evidence that a parent's work schedule "affect[s] the well-being of the children"-not
hypothetically, but actually. See Silva, 142 Idaho at 906, 136 P.3d at 375.
Here, the Court made no finding that Sydney's temporary job "affect[ed] the well-being
of the children." Id. The Court hypothesized that Mark would be more available than Sydney if
an emergency came up while she was in Victor, see Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law

,r 19, R. 473, but no evidence supported this suggestion. The parties had family in town, and they
had never had a problem. But even if the Court's hypothetical could sustain its finding, the
finding relied on a false premise-that Sydney had the Victor employment at the time of its
January 22, 2019 decision. She didn't. And the Court knew Sydney's Victor employment would
end around Thanksgiving 2018. Tr. 278:2-18; Tr. 285:2-5; Tr. 319:5-321:3; Tr. 393:8-394:7;
Order on Motion to Reconsider, R. 539.
Next, the Court found that "[t]he children are not doing well with" a "50/50" schedule
and that "B.F. is struggling in school on this schedule." Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law,
Appellant's Reply Brief
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,r,r 17-18, R. 473. But again, the Court did not find that Sydney's temporary job was the cause of
the children's struggles. And there was no evidence that the record would support such a finding.
Tr. 217:17-218:7 (identifying no significant problems even with child a little behind in school);
Tr. 20:22-21: 12 (showing child's behavioral problems pre-dated divorce worsening with the
break up consistent with other children observed following parent's divorce). Thus, the Court
neither made nor could have made findings to support a factual nexus between Sydney's two
months working in Victor at the time of trial and any impact on the children.
What's more, unlike Silva the Court ignored the fact that Sydney would not be working
in Victor by the time the Court rendered its decision. 142 Idaho at 904, 136 P.3d at 374 (focusing
the analysis on Mom's prospective employment plans-without faulting her for temporary
continued night shifts). This Court should vacate the Magistrate Court's custody decision
because it failed to apply the correct legal standard when it considered Sydney's temporary
employment without proof that her job would have any impact on the children's well-being.

C.

Neither Reason Nor Record Evidence Sustain the Court's Decision.

The custody decision is unreasonable and unsupported by the record. This Court should
vacate it as "insufficient to support" the Magistrate Court's conclusions. Silva, 142 Idaho at 904,
136 P.3d at 375. Three cases, Silva v. Silva, Markwood v. Markwood, 152 Idaho 756, 274 P.3d
1271 (Ct. App. 2012), and Moye v. Moye, 102 Idaho 170,172,627 P.2d 799,801 (1981), explain
the problems with the Magistrate Court's decision.
1.

Contrasting Silva to this case supports vacating the custody decision.

In Silva, a modification case, both Mom and Dad worked overlapping nightshifts that had
continued for years (not weeks). Silva, 142 Idaho at 902-03, 136 P.3d at 373-74. For Dad, the
evidence showed "changing to a day shift would be difficult or impossible .... " Id. at 903, 136
P.3d at 373. What's more when Dad worked "he was not available to be with the children when
Appellant's Reply Brief
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they awoke in the morning, during evenings, or when they wakened in the night. Even when he
was available during the day, his fatigue interfered with his ability to care for the children, who
entertained themselves while he slept.” Id. at 906, 136 P.3d at 377.
Equally important, the Silva Court recognized that its custody decision must be forward
looking—not premised solely on circumstances as of the hearing date. In fact, at the March
evidentiary hearing, Mom was still working night shifts. See id. at 904, 136 P.3d at 374. “[S]he
was attempting to change her work schedule.” Id. But she wouldn’t be eligible to start day shifts
until months later in July, and even then, her day schedule would only “remain in place for the
following six months.” Id. In other words, Mom was “still pursuing a position that required only
day shifts”—she hadn’t found one yet. Id. The Court didn’t fault her for the prospective nature of
her plans, as the Court did here. Just the opposite. The Court viewed her conduct favorably in
awarding her primary custody. Id. at 903–904, 136 P.3d at 374–75.
No doubt each case is different, but the law should be clear that the analysis is forward
focused. It accounts for a parents’ history and present circumstances, but the law focuses the
inquiry on the circumstances likely to exist when the order takes effect. The transitionary period
during the divorce proceedings is not a reliable baseline for establishing parent’s custody
arrangement for the foreseeable future.
Mark’s answer (at 20) is that Sydney should be seeking a modification, but that makes no
sense at all. Modification isn’t the appropriate avenue for circumstances known at the time of
trial and comprising the reality months before the initial divorce and custody judgment ever
becomes final. Marks cites Sweet v. Foreman, 159 Idaho 761, 367 P.3d 156 (2016) for the
proposition that after entering its findings the magistrate court cannot consider new evidence that
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did not exist at the time of trial. That appears to be the holding in Sweet. 2 But the problem here is
the Court did know about the circumstances at the time of trial. The evidence is undisputed (and
the lower Court conceded) that it knew Sydney's circumstances were temporary. Yet it still
issued findings of fact based on circumstances it knew were not the reality when its order issued.
That's an abuse of discretion even under Sweet.
What's more, the Court in Silva did not restrict drastically Dad's parenting time. Despite
the Court's concerns about his night shifts, the Court awarded "Sunday afternoon through
Tuesday, Thursday afternoons, Saturdays in the summer when Nancy is at work, and various
holidays." Id. That's much more time than every other weekend (Friday after work through
Sunday at 8 p.m.) and visitation every other Wednesday afternoon (3 p.m. to 8 p.m.). R. 544.
Sydney never worked night shifts. She finished her dental assistant program within weeks of the
trial. Tr. 319:24-320:5. And she wasn't commuting when the Court entered its findings of fact.
R. 472 (January 22, 2019 Findings & Conclusions), R. 539 (acknowledging awareness that

Sydney's employment was temporary). And by the time the Judgment entered and the Court's
custody arrangement took effect, two more months had passed. R. 531 (March 19, 2019
Judgment), R. 544 (May 31, 2019 Amended Judgment). This is exactly why custody decisions
must be forward-looking-not hyper-focused on fleeting circumstances at the time of trial. The

2

Sydney recognizes that the Supreme Court's holding in Sweet binds this Court. So this brief
will not belabor Sweet's inconsistency with the governing statute in this brief. But in short, Idaho
Code§ 32-717(1) is clear that "the court may, before and after judgment, give such direction for
the custody, care and education of the children of the marriage as may seem necessary or proper
in the best interests of the children." No express text of the Family Law Rules of Procedure
contradicts this statutory command. Sweet imported a principle from the civil rules and civil
trials that often makes sense. But briefly to preserve the issue, Mark's reading of Sweet is both
contrary to statute and unwarranted as applied to custody determinations where the new, material
facts arise after trial but before both the entry of the findings of facts and final judgment. Parents
shouldn't have to file a new petition for modification the day the judgment enters. The added
cost, prolonged uncertainty, and mental toll of litigation are not conducive to the best interests of
the children.
Appellant's Reply Brief
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custody decision cannot stand on the Magistrate Court’s findings. This Court should vacate and
remand.
2.

Markwood also supports remanding for a record-supported custody
decision.

Markwood, another modification cases, also presents a good contrast to this case. Mom
and Dad had a custody arrangement where Mom had weekdays and Dad had weekends. 152
Idaho at 758, 274 P.3d at 1273. Later, Mom moved from Idaho to Oregon and Dad filed for
modification. Given the new distance between the parties, they couldn’t keep their current
schedule—someone had to have the kids for longer to minimize inter-state travel. See id. at 759,
274 P.3d at 1274. Dad had three job options at the time, he could work “twelve-hour shifts
Friday through Sunday, either from 5 a.m. to 5 p.m., or 5 p.m. to 5 a.m.; or he could work from 4
p.m. to 2:30 a.m. Monday through Thursday.” Id. at 762, 274 P.3d at 1277. “Any of these
choices would have substantially limited his ability to care for and spend time with the children
on work days.” Id. Along with Dad’s forward-looking circumstances, the Court found that Dad’s
“work history ‘has been somewhat sporadic in terms of his ability to spend . . . time with the
children.’ He had often worked long hours during the weekends, which was his only time to
spend with the children, so they had been left largely in the care of [Dad’s] girlfriend.” Id.
The facts the Court found here are just the opposite of Markwood. Both parents live and
intend to remain in Idaho Falls. Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, R. 477. So there’s no
issue of interstate travel precluding ample parenting time for both parties. What’s more, the
Court found that “[b]oth parties love their children,” “[b]oth parties are good parents and have a
good relationship with the children,” but “Sydney was more involved with the children in their
early years” as Mark had the history of “long hours at Roof Rescue.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 8, R. 472–73.
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Analyzing present circumstances, the Court acknowledged some of Mark’s days “are
longer than others.” Id. ¶ 8, R. 473. Even so, the Court recognized that “more recently the
children have benefitted from a stable and equal relationship from both parents” and “[t]he
children have been seeing both parents equally since separation.” Id. The Court credited Mark’s
testimony that he now “has the ability to adjust his schedule as needed.” Id. ¶ 8, R. 473. If
anything, the historical facts make Mark the figure more like the father in Markwood. So how
did the lower court arrive at a custody arrangement that slashes the equal time the children have
known all their lives?
The Court relied only on Sydney’s fleeting Victor employment that the Court well-knew
would end shortly after trial. In factual findings false the day they issued, the Court found that
“Sydney travels to Victor for work, which adds 3 hours of commute time to her day. Sydney’s
work schedule with travel is 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.” Id. ¶ 9, R. 473. Based on this false premise,
the Court reasoned that “Mark’s work schedule would allow him to be with the children on a
more consistent basis than Sydney’s would.” Id. ¶ 19, R. 474. The Court kept finding that Mark
would be “more available than Sydney if an emergency came up” because he “works mainly in
Bonneville County while Sydney works in Victor.” Id. ¶ 19, R. 474, 478. Perpetuating its error,
the Court reiterated the point again in its conclusions:
Mark would be more available to the children and be able to spend
more time with the children during the week than Sydney. Further,
in the winter months, the commute for Sydney could vary in time
and take much longer for her to commute to and from work. This
also provides an obstacle for the Court when considering
continuity and stability.
Id. R. 478. The Court’s references to winter driving concerns were no more than a fiction both
because the Court knew Sydney wouldn’t have the Victor job after Thanksgiving and because
the Court did nothing to alter the 50/50 custody arrangement that continued throughout the
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winter until entry of the Court’s judgment in March. R. 531. This type of unreasoned analysis
inconsistent with the undisputed record is quintessential abuse of discretion that warrants a
remand.
3.

Under Moye, the Court’s internally inconsistent decision improperly
elevated Sydney’s fleeting job circumstances over all else—including
the children’s long history of both parties parenting equally.

Even if this Court determines that Sydney’s Victor employment had some relevance to
the custody decision, elevating that fact over all others violates the principle in Moye v. Moye,
102 Idaho 170, 172, 627 P.2d 799, 801 (1981). “[A]n abuse of discretion may also occur where
the court overemphasizes one factor, such as [Sydney’s temporary Victor employment], thereby
similarly failing to support its conclusion that the welfare and interests of a child will be best
served by a particular custody award.” That is precisely what happened here.
It was undisputed that Sydney would be doing (or done with) her clinical hours as a
dental assistant living and working in-town in Idaho Falls by the time the Court’s order had any
effect. Tr. 319:22–320:18. No one contradicted her testimony. The Court made no adverse
credibility finding. And there was no evidence she wasn’t fulfilling her class obligations. Yet the
Court’s analysis operates from the premise that Sydney remained employed in Victor. E.g.,
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law R. 478 (analyzing the effect of winter driving conditions
as though it is a present and continuing obstacle to her availability). The Court did not have a
reasonable basis to elevate temporary circumstances over those that would be in place when its
custody order took effect.
Moreover, the Court’s conclusion about stability and continuity ignored its other recordbacked findings. At the time of trial, the parties’ two children were

Tr.

6:23–25. The Court acknowledged that Sydney’s children have never had less than equal time in
their mom’s care—recognizing that Sydney was a stay-at-home mom in the early years and
Appellant’s Reply Brief
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shared equally in the parenting throughout the children's lives including during the divorce.
Findings ofFact & Conclusions ofLaw ,r,r 2,13 R. 472-73, R. 477.

It's apparent from these facts and the analysis above, that the Court's findings and
conclusions placed inordinate weight Sydney's temporary Victor employment.
In sum, the Court's dramatic reduction in Sydney's time with the children lacks
reasonable support in the record. This Court should vacate the custody decision and remand the
issue to the Magistrate Court.

II.

THE LOWER COURT WAS PROPERLY APPRISED OF THE PROBLEMS
WITH ITS FINDINGS.
Sydney presented her challenge to the findings (and lack thereof) to the Magistrate Court.

Mark's challenge under Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 802 lacks merit. In her February
4th motion, Sydney did not "remain silent" she raised the problems with the Court's findings and
conclusions-the same problems she now asserts on appeal. R. 484-93. For example, she
challenged the custody findings (and lack thereof). R. 484-88. She challenged the Court's
treatment of domestic violence. R. 486-87. And she disputed the spousal maintenance as well. R.
492-93. The law required nothing more to preserve her challenge.

III.

THE COURT ERRED IN ITS TREATMENT OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
ISSUE. SYDNEY PRESERVED THE ISSUE. THIS COURT SHOULD CORRECT
IT.
Mark's basic argument is that Sydney didn't preserve her assertions of error on the

domestic violence issue and that the Court properly weighed the evidence, so this court cannot
disturb the decision. Both assertions lack merit. Sydney properly preserved the issue, and Mark
misunderstands the assignment of error on appeal. The problem here is the Court's failure to
make a finding about the truthfulness or credibility of Sydney's testimony. The Court stated only
that it gave little weight to the allegation because it Sydney did not disclose it until trial. If this
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was a discovery sanction, it was improper because no party raised a discovery motion or asked
the Court to exclude the testimony as undisclosed. If the testimony was admissible, the Court
should not have disregarded it without first concluding the testimony was untruthful or not
credible. Thus, Sydney presents a process problem-not a weighing problem. Hudelson v. Delta

Intern. Machinery Corp, 142 Idaho 244, 248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005) (noting that appellate
review focuses "upon the process used by the trial judge in reaching his or her decision"); Quick

v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759,772,727 P.2d 1187, 1200 (1986) (noting discretion "requires an actual
exercise of judgment and a consideration of the facts and circumstances").

A.

Sydney Preserved the Domestic Violence Issue.

Sydney testified that "until recently" she did not "know that marital rape was domestic
violence." Tr. 394:22-395:1. What's more, trial counsel promptly raised the Court's error in the
post-trial motion, faulting the court for "penaliz[ing] Sydney for not reporting rape to the police,
which is common for victims of rape, especially within the marital context." R. 486. The motion
directly responded to the alleged discovery omission pointing out the Court's failure to treat both
parties equally-giving weight to evidence of Sydney's work schedule (raised for the first time
at trial) but discounting Sydney's allegation of domestic violence without a finding that it was
untruthful. R. 486-90.
Trial counsel's argument continued: "To disregard troubling testimony of Mark's
domestic violence but make a custody decision based exclusively on commute times is an abuse
of discretion." R. 487. Counsel continued "[t]he Court needs to reverse its holding that it does
not give much weight to this factor and either disregard Sydney's testimony as untruthful or give
it the weight that it is due." R. 487. Mark's assertion that Sydney did not preserve the issue lacks
merit.
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What's more, Mark offers no on-point authority for his assertion that it is improper to
raise additional evidence on an issue preserved below in the appellate forum. If parties were
limited to the cases and authority cited below, there would be no need for appellate briefs. Parties
must preserve issues, but additional supporting authority is always a part of the appellate process.
Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 220 P.3d 580 (2009), says only that a litigant may not
"remain silent" and must raise all "substantive issues" to the trial court. See id. at 229-30, 220
P.3d at 585-86. As shown, Sydney did not remain silent. She properly raised this problem to the
Magistrate Court to no avail.

B.

The Court Improperly Disregarded Domestic Violence Evidence Without
Finding It Untruthful or Not Credible.

Mark does little to respond to the merits of the Court's error. Contrary to his assertion the
Court did not make a finding that Sydney was untruthful or not credible. The Court stated only
that it gave the allegation little weight. R. 479. For the reasons amply set forth in the opening
brief, this Court should make clear that it is error for a court to discount marital violence based
solely on the issues first appearance at trial. If the witness was untruthful or not credible, that is a
different matter. Also, if a party brings a motion for a discovery sanction, that also raises a
different issue. Neither circumstance arose here, and domestic violence is a scourge that the
Magistrate Court should not have disregarded. As argued in the opening brief, domestic violence
is at the heart of the statutory analysis of several matters-custody, spousal maintenance, and
attorney fees. The Court should vacate the lower court's decision and remand for proper
consideration of this important issue.
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IV.

THE COURT SHOULD VACATE
MAINTENANCE DECISION.

AND

REMAND

THE

SPOUSAL

The maintenance issue is well-covered in both briefs. 3 The bottom line is the Court was
flat inconsistent in its treatment of Sydney. On maintenance it finds she's able to cover her needs
while faulting her in the custody context for her employment uncertainty and new education. No
doubt there were areas that Mark pointed out errors in Sydney's budget. But the Court did not
explain its disparity in treatment, and the Magistrate Court should revisit the issue on remand.
V.

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING SYDNEY'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY
FEES. MARK SHOULD NOT BE AWARD ED FEES ON APPEAL.
Sydney's opening brief ably covers the attorney fee issue. As to Mark's claim for

attorney fees on appeal, there is no basis to conclude this appeal is frivolous. The appeal presents
important issues about the forward-looking focus of the custody analysis. It also raises an
important issue about the treatment of domestic violence allegations. No matter how the Court
resolves these issues on the merits, the substance of the briefs establishes that the appeal is not
the kind that entitles the appellee to an award of fees.
CONCLUSION
This is an important case about the proper focus of the custody inquiry and the treatment
of domestic violence allegations. The Court's decision was inconsistent with law, unreasonable,
and without record support. This Court should vacate the Court's custody decision and remand
for a determination consistent with the correct standards and the relevant evidence. The same is
true of spousal maintenance. Lastly, Sydney should be awarded her attorney fees.

3

One error in Marks' brief warrants mention. Exhibit 6 was not admitted into evidence it was
illustrative only, ER 151, and the record testimony also showed that it wasn't even accurateshowing certain property as Sydney's when it had in fact been awarded to Mark. Tr. 117:11-13.
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DATED this 18th day of October 2019

John E. Cutler
PARSONS BERLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant
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